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Introduction: the military ethic and a changing 
profession
For many of today’s armed forces, peacekeeping, humanitarian, and rebuilding mis-
sions are becoming increasingly important. In these missions militaries are duty-
bound to exercise self-control, trying to practice a non-threatening style that is 
respectful with the local population, and characterized by minimal use of force (Van 
Baarda and Verweij, 2006: 8). Clearly, the rationale behind such hearts-and-minds 
approaches, and the restraint exercised, is to a large extent self-serving: winning over 
the local population is essential for the success of today’s missions, something that 
as a rule can only be reached by limiting the number of civilian casualties as much 
as possible. A rising civilian death toll fuels resistance to one’s own military person-
nel, while a restrained approach is thought to yield better information and more 
cooperation from the local population, and thus, in the end, increased security for 
the troops. That these rationales are self-serving seems to suggest that consequences 
to the local population might count for less if the expediency argument would no 
longer hold. At first sight, that might seem a rather unsatisfactory conclusion. Yet, 
as it stands, and notwithstanding all good intentions to reduce the number of civil-
ian casualties, the largest part of military codes, military oaths, value systems, and 
culture seem antagonistic to the idea that the life of a local civilian counts for the 
same as that of a Western soldier; military effectiveness and the interests of organi-
zations and colleagues still hold central place in the military ethic (Robinson, 2007). 
 This ethic took shape, however, at a time in which the interests of the local popu-
lation played a lesser role, as the main task of Western militaries was the defence 
of the own territory. What we see today is that there is, as a result of the afore-
mentioned shift of tasks, an increasing pressure on military personnel to take the 
interests of others than just the organization and colleagues into account, in recent 
years more so than ever before. This poses questions and dilemmas for them that 
they were not likely to encounter in earlier days. It is not always clear, for instance, 
how they are to deal with situations in which conflicting values – the safety of 
oneself and one’s colleagues versus the safety of the local population, but possibly 
also between military virtues and more civilian ones – impose conflicting demands 
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on them. This article focuses on the battle of Chora, fought in the Afghan province 
of Uruzgan, and on the difficulty of having to balance the safety of colleagues with 
that of the Afghani. However, it also tries to give some clues for how to assess how 
well that balancing act was done in Chora. To do so, the following section describes 
the prelude, battle, and aftermath of the battle, and illustrates the restraints modern 
armed forces face these days. The subsequent two sections try to make sense of what 
happened in Chora in light of the just war tradition and our tendency to give prior-
ity to the interests of near and dear. The section after that focuses on the role of the 
conscience of military personnel, and is followed by the conclusion.
Chora: prelude, battle, and aftermath
From August 2006 to August 2010, some sixty years after the police actions in the 
Dutch Indies, the Netherlands military was involved in another counter-insurgen-
cy mission in Asia, again with the aim to restore order, although this time under the 
scrutinizing eye of the media, and with a public that is sensitive to both the number 
of Dutch casualties and (albeit perhaps less so) the fate of the local population. 
These sensitivities clashed when on 10 June 2007 the district of Chora was sur-
rounded by three hundred to a thousand Taliban fighters. At the time, the district 
had Dutch (about 60) and Afghan troops within its borders, and was also home to 
75,000 Afghans who depended on them for protection. Extra Afghan police forces 
were requested, yet the few reserves that were sent by the Minister of Interior to 
Uruzgan to help, in the end refused to go to Chora. After a suicide attack on 15 June, 
killing Private First Class Timo Smeehuijzen and five Afghan children, the Dutch 
and Afghan troops came under a coordinated attack on 16 June.
 Just two months earlier, because of the limited progress with this restrained 
approach, the Dutch troops changed to a more outgoing approach – from an ink 
spot approach to a more mobile amoeba approach –, increasing the chances of encoun-
ters with the Taliban. The Minister of Defence, however, denied that a change of 
strategy had taken place and stated, in line with the restrained Dutch approach 
(a term policy makers have come to shun, incidentally, claiming that all countries 
involved use the same method), that Dutch military personnel in Afghanistan are 
‘as civilian as possible, and as military as necessary’ (MoD, 2007). This remark pretty 
much captured the prevalent opinion in Dutch politics, in turn mirroring the popu-
lar sentiment that Dutch military personnel should only be sent to Afghanistan to 
rebuild, not to fight. Political support in parliament for the decision in early 2006 to 
send troops to Uruzgan was, in fact, on the condition that it should be a ‘rebuilding-
mission’ and not a ‘fighting-mission’ – notwithstanding the fact that these terms, 
which were used a lot in discussions in parliament and in the media, were hardly 
used within the Defence organization; it preferred the term counter-insurgency, 
covering both aspects. The reality it faces, however, is that the majority of the Dutch 
population would like to see that its armed forces are used only for humanitarian 
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missions (Koelé and Ramdharie, 2004). In line with that popular sentiment, parlia-
mentarians and journalists tended to closely monitor the ratio between the progress 
made in rebuilding and the time and effort spent in fighting the Taliban; something 
bound to have an influence on the way things are undertaken in Uruzgan. 
 Yet, notwithstanding this peaceful inclination, and contrary to the so-called 
body bag hypothesis (the assumption that public support for a mission dwindles in 
case of casualties), opinion polls also showed that more casualties will not neces-
sarily mean the end of public support for the mission in Afghanistan. In July 2010, 
for instance, no more than 32 per cent of the population were of the opinion that in 
case of casualties Dutch soldiers should be withdrawn from Afghanistan, whereas 
43 per cent thought the opposite (MoD, 2010). Apparently, there is a reluctance to 
resort to the use of the military in risk operations, yet also a wish not to shrink if 
the decision to deploy military personnel has been taken. 
 It is against this background that both journalists and military personnel who 
had been in the area during the battle for Chora later recounted having had asso-
ciations with the Srebrenica tragedy of July 1995. On the evening of the 11th of that 
month, the day that the (in numbers and weaponry) superior Serbian troops had 
captured ‘the safe area’ thousands of Muslims had taken refuge to, the Dutch Min-
ister of Defence and his colleagues in the cabinet in their bunker in the Hague at 
the time felt that the Dutch troops should show solidarity with the remaining local 
population and refugees. In retrospect this sounds somewhat hollow, seeing that, 
due to an insufficient mandate and a lack of men and weapons, the Dutch battalion 
had been unable to prevent either the fall of Srebrenica or the subsequent murder 
of 7,000 Muslims it was supposed to protect. 
 Something traumatic like that should not happen again in Uruzgan. The deci-
sion was quickly made not to leave the local population in the hands of the Taliban, 
and large elements of the 500-men Dutch Battle Group were moved in over the 
next two days. Howitzers, Apaches, and F-16s, not available in Srebrenica, were 
called in to assist the troops on the ground in Chora. After a three-day battle, con-
trol of the area was regained. About 200 Taliban were killed in the biggest battle 
fought by the Netherlands military since Korea, while one Dutch sergeant-major 
died due to an accident with a mortar. Next to this, an unknown number of civil-
ians lost their lives. According to a report by the Afghanistan Independent Human 
Rights Commission and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(2007), estimates range from 30 to 88, with 60 to 70 being a more realistic estimate. 
About 15 had been tortured, shot or beheaded, and torched by the Taliban, yet about 
35 to 65 others possibly died as a result of bombardments by Dutch artillery, despite 
efforts to warn the local population beforehand using loudspeakers.
 According to that same report the methods used by ISAF were heavy-handed, 
and not always accurate. President Karzai and the ISAF Commander, US General 
Dan McNeill, criticized the Dutch for using a howitzer, positioned 40 kilometres 
from Chora, without a forward controller. According to McNeill, in a classified 
report, this last element was a breach of the law of war. In the view of others, 
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and among them Dutch Secretary General of NATO De Hoop Scheffer, a modern 
howitzer such as the one used in Chora (the PzH 2000), can do without a forward 
controller. Later, in October 2007, rumour had it that Australian troops in Uruz-
gan, operating under Dutch command, had refused to participate in the operation, 
worrying about the risks the operation would impose on civilians, and being of the 
opinion that participating in the operation would go against the rules of engage-
ment. However, Karzai’s, McNeill’s, and, possibly, the Australians’ misgivings not-
withstanding, a Dutch district attorney decided on 30 June 2008 not to prosecute 
military personnel for what happened in Chora, as they had acted within the limits 
set by the law of war and their rules of engagement. A potential discussion on how 
far the Western militaries’ moral obligations to the local population should go, and 
when force protection becomes risk aversion, was thus reduced to a dispute on 
technical and legal issues, with the disputants roughly divided along national lines. 
 Interestingly, these criticisms from McNeill, Karzai, and the Australians came 
some months after critique on the Dutch approach that at first sight seemed to 
be of an opposite character (i.e., that the Dutch approach was in fact not heavy-
handed but, to the contrary, much too soft). In December 2006, some high-ranking 
Canadian and British officers testified to seeing this approach as essentially flawed, 
because it avoided doing what is a precondition for rebuilding Afghanistan: dis-
mantling the Taliban. According to them the, at that time, relatively small numbers 
of Dutch casualties gave evidence to its exaggerated caution, cowardice even (cri-
tique that also brought back to the minds of many in the Netherlands the tragedy 
in Srebrenica and the following – and ongoing – debate in the media whether the 
Dutch lack courage). This censure also led to some debate in NATO and subsequent 
media attention in the Dutch newspapers, with the latter providing a forum for 
Dutch commanders in Uruzgan, assuring the readers that the Dutch soldier fights 
as well as any other. In fact, however, both accusations – too careful at first, too 
heavy-handed later – come down to the same thing: Dutch military personnel are 
not willing enough to run risks at their own peril. 
 Leaving aside that this critique might be undue (according to Anthony King 
(2010) fighting was, to the detriment of their mission, an end in itself for the British 
troops in Helmand), the criticism of being risk-averse could be launched against all 
NATO and US troops in Afghanistan. According to a recent report of the Human 
Rights Watch on civilian casualties in Afghanistan the number of civilian losses 
caused by airpower tripled from 2006 to 2007 as a result of the combination of light 
ground forces and overwhelming airpower’’ (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 2, 14).
 The same report warns that airstrikes that hit villages ‘have also had significant 
political impact, outraging public opinion in Afghanistan and undermining public 
confidence in both the Afghan government and its international backers’ (Human 
Rights Watch 2008: 3). The rising civilian death toll is thought to increase support 
for, and facilitate recruitment by, the Taliban (responsible for 75% of the civilian 
deaths in 2010). Taking ‘tactical measures to reduce civilian deaths may at times put 
combatants at greater risk,’ yet is a prerequisite for maintaining the support of the 
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local population (Human Rights Watch, 2008: 5), which in its turn is something the 
mission in Afghanistan depends on.
 It is probably for these reasons that the second half of 2007 saw a change in 
NATO tactics, reducing the amount of civilian casualties significantly, at least tem-
porarily; the death toll rose again during the first seven months of 2008 (Human 
Rights Watch 2008: 6). The number of civilian casualties dropped again in 2009, 
most likely as a result of ‘ISAF’s declared strategy of prioritizing the safety and 
security of civilians’ (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 2009: 23), 
and then dropped even further in 2010 (United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan, 2010). Nonetheless, aerial attacks still caused 171 deaths in 2010, and 
worryingly 102 of them in the second half of that year (United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan, 2010). What’s more, as a result of a lot of money and effort 
spent, Western militaries seem to get better at killing without getting killed than 
they already were. Today, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles reduces the risks for 
military personnel to about zero, but has in recent years taken many innocent lives 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. With such a distance – physical, but also psychologi-
cal – between a soldier and the horrors of war, it has to be feared that killing might 
get a bit easier. Such ‘statistical’ victims, however, in general seem to attract rela-
tively little attention, especially when compared with the interest in the more visible 
and ‘real’ victims of Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo Bay, and Haditha.
Intentions and consequences
That civilian deaths, such as the 35 to 65 in Chora, seem to count for less – at least 
in the eyes of politicians, militaries, media, and most citizens – has at least two rea-
sons: partly, the victims are often geographically and psychologically far removed 
from us, but, more importantly, their deaths were, although perhaps foreseen, cer-
tainly not intended – civilian casualties are an unhappy side-effect of otherwise 
well intended actions. One could say that the first reason (that nearness matters) is 
considered a fact of life that has to be accepted as such, while the second reason (the 
relevance of intention) seems to be a more principled one that is in line with basic 
moral intuitions shared by most people.
 Regarding the second reason, the relevance of intention, some might argue that 
the difference between intended and unintended casualties is not that relevant, 
and therefore hold that a mission should not be carried out if civilian casualties are 
among the foreseen (or foreseeable) consequences – this is in effect the position 
taken by most pacifists, holding that the killing of innocent people in war is never 
pardonable. In modern warfare there are always innocent casualties, hence their 
conclusion that under the present conditions wars should not be fought (Fiala, 
2010). As it basically rules out war altogether, this position is according to many 
authors too strict, as it forbids wars of self-defence and, more generally, does not 
allow war even in the cases that not fighting a war seems the immoral thing to do. 
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For that reason they tend to take a more realistic approach, and insofar as they do 
so without actually falling into the extreme of realism (holding that in war there is 
no room for moral considerations) they can find guidance in the just war tradition, 
which attempts to offer an alternative for pacifism and realism alike. 
 To address the unavoidable taking of innocent life, as said the main objection to 
war in the eyes of many pacifists, just war theorists have put forward the principle 
of double effect. That principle is formulated differently by different authors, but 
basically states that acts that have evil consequences are nonetheless permitted if 
four conditions are met:
1. the act is not bad in itself (such as the use of a howitzer against the Taliban 
during the Battle of Chora);
2. the direct effect is good (for instance the destruction of the Taliban); 
3. the intention is good (the destruction of the Taliban and the saving of 
Chora are intended, civilian deaths are not); and 
4. the intended good effects (the destruction of the Taliban and the saving 
of Chora) outweigh the unintended bad effects (civilian deaths), i.e., the 
chosen means should be proportional (Anscombe, 1961; Walzer, 1992: 153). 
Most authors agree that the third proviso, about intention, forms the core of the 
principle (Michael Walzer calls it ‘the burden of the argument’). Underlying that 
clause is ‘the claim that there is a stronger presumption against action that has 
harm to the innocent as an intended effect than there is against otherwise com-
parable action that causes the same amount of harm to the innocent as a foreseen 
but unintended effect’ (McMahan, 1994). Behind this idea is the even more basic 
distinction between ‘what one does to people and what merely happens to them as 
a result of what one does’ (Nagel, 1972: 131), for example between killing and let-
ting die. Doing without this distinction would bring military personnel involved in 
unintentional killing on the same level as terrorists. Then again, the double effect 
principle requires little effort on the part of the military to minimize civilian casu-
alties in its traditional understanding. As long as the latter are an unintended (and 
proportional) side-effect of legitimate attacks on military targets, and the use of a 
howitzer in the battle for Chora seems to be an example, these attacks are within 
the principle’s limits. 
 However, although the intentional killing of a noncombatant is evidently evil, 
it is not so that unintentional deaths do not amount to a bad thing that should be 
avoided, if at all possible, and some might wonder if militaries sometimes invoke 
the principle of double effect a bit too easily. ‘Simply not to intend the death of 
civilians is too easy,’ writes just war theorist and political philosopher Michael 
Walzer (1992: 155). It is especially because of the principle’s lenience that Walzer in 
Just and Unjust Wars famously restated it, holding that soldiers have a further ‘obli-
gation to attend to the rights of civilians’ (1992: 155), and that ‘due care’ should be 
taken. However, it is not enough to make efforts to avoid civilian casualties as much 
as possible; a soldier has to do this ‘accepting costs to himself,’ i.e., accepting risk 
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to his or her life if necessary (1992: 155). Writes Walzer: we tend to ‘look for a sign 
of a positive commitment to save civilian lives’ that says that ‘if saving civilian lives 
means risking soldiers’ lives, the risk must be accepted’ (1992, p. 156). It seems that 
the use of a howitzer in Chora, although within the limits set by the doctrine of 
double effect in its traditional formulation, might fall short in light of the principle 
as reformulated by Walzer. Then again, the decision to stay in Chora to defend does 
testify to an acceptance of risk; clearly, leaving the population of Chora at the mercy 
of the Taliban would have been safer for Dutch military personnel but would have 
resulted in many civilian casualties – in all likelihood much more than now have 
died as a result of the artillery shelling.
 A final remark to finish this section with: although Walzer addresses the princi-
ple of double effect’s leniency, he stops short of actually putting the consequences to 
civilians to the fore; ultimately a sincere effort to avoid civilian casualties is deemed 
more important than whether or not that effort is successful. To return to Chora: 
it seems that, for Walzer, that acceptance of risk by Dutch soldiers in a attempt 
to reduce the amount of civilian casualties would have been more important than 
whether or not that effort was, in fact, successful. Why it is that in a military context 
the intention should matter that much is, however, still far from self-evident. The 
explanation probably lies in the principle’s background: one of the purposes of the 
double effect doctrine was to reconcile Christianity’s rejection of violence with the 
fact that in war innocent people are killed due to acts of Christian soldiers (Ans-
combe, 1961). Intentions are hence mainly deemed relevant because of the effect 
on the soldier’s moral standing: if he or she kills a noncombatant unintentionally 
instead of intentionally, we hold him or her a better person for it. Ultimately the 
principle of double effect is more about the actor, and his ability to look at himself 
in the mirror, than about those at the receiving end.
Distance
Others have put the consequences to all parties involved to the fore, however; 
according to the Australian philosopher Peter Singer (1972), for instance, we have 
a moral duty to prevent the suffering of others if we are in a situation that allows 
us to do so ‘without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance’. 
The fact that some catastrophe is happening far away does not exempt us in any way 
from our moral duty to act. If, for example, Westerners are in a position to some-
what lessen suffering in poor countries by opting for a more sober lifestyle, and 
donating what they thus save to those who need it so much more, they have a moral 
duty to do so. At first sight, it appears to follow from this standpoint that possible 
adverse consequences to the local population and the civilian casualties in Chora 
form an obvious example should count for a lot more than they do at present. 
 Then again, some authors dispute that soldiers really have far-reaching obliga-
tions to strangers in times of war, and it has been a topic of debate whether or 
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not they can in fact be subjected to higher risks with the purpose of lowering the 
risks for foreign civilians (Walzer and Margalit, 2009). It seems, indeed, somewhat 
presumptuous to expect military personnel to run risks on the behalf of strangers, 
while most of us do not feel an obligation to donate most of our surplus money 
to, say, hunger or malaria fighting organizations. In that light, it is not so clear to 
what degree (if any) there was a moral obligation on the part of the Dutch soldiers 
defending Chora to risk their lives protecting outsiders. They were not confronted 
with the choice between one’s own wish to lead a luxurious life and the right to 
life of those starving in faraway countries, but between one’s own right to life and 
that of colleagues on the one hand, and that of a stranger on the other. In their 
case, giving priority to the safety of the local population is doing considerably more 
than what Singer asks for when he states that we are to help strangers if that can 
be done ‘without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance.’ 
From this point of view (which already demands a lot more than most of us are 
willing to give) the Dutch soldiers probably did not have to accept these costs to 
themselves, which are so clearly of ‘moral importance.’ Most military personnel are, 
understandably, above all concerned about the safety of their colleagues, which they 
(similar to politicians and the public) rate higher than that of the local population. 
 At the same time, it is clear that this position seems somewhat at odds with the 
intent behind operations like that in Uruzgan, and the tactics employed: trying to 
prevent the population of Uruzgan from developing loyalties to the Taliban. One 
could therefore argue that, even if a truly impartial view may be expecting too much 
from soldiers involved in a regular war, soldiers and policy makers might be expect-
ed to take a somewhat more unbiased view of today’s more humanitarian opera-
tions. That would have the beneficial effect that civilian casualties that are a result 
of reducing the risks for Western military personnel would be taken somewhat 
less lightly than at present sometimes seems to be the case. In What We Owe To 
Each Other, Thomas Scanlon described thinking about right and wrong as ‘think-
ing about what could be justified to others on grounds that they, if appropriately 
motivated, could not reasonably reject’ (1998: 5). Mere distance and the absence of 
intention certainly do not seem to be such grounds.
 However, incidents in recent years have shown that the restraint required in 
today’s operations does not always come naturally. Although most of us would like 
to see military personnel upholding high moral standards even when, for instance, 
the media are not present, it is the question whether that demand is realistic. It 
seems that especially for those who are led by how their behaviour might look in 
the eyes of others, what is only known privately and not out in the open does, in a 
sense, not even exist. This brings us to the matter of the conscience of the soldier.
MIlITARy eTHICs AnD AfGHAnIsTAn / 89
Conscience in military practice
The ideal (conscientious) soldier or warrior resembles the ‘good cowboy,’ familiar 
from the John Wayne and Clint Eastwood Westerns, riding off in the sunset after 
finishing his job in a morally responsible way, leaving the viewers in the conviction 
that justice has been done. However, these westerns clearly tell us that there are not 
only good guys but also bad ones. In the same way we are informed by everyday 
military practice that there are not only ‘good’ soldiers in the military. Too many 
incidents have shown that a humanitarian ethos is not by definition part of their 
military equipment, or to put it differently, that not all soldiers are moral agents. 
 According to American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr ‘politics will, to the end 
of history, be an arena where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and 
coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and 
uneasy compromises’ (Niebuhr quoted by Doyle 1997: 383). In this statement, con-
science seems to refer to both the individual and social aspects of conscience, and 
the political and military consequences of these aspects. They are all part of the pro-
cess in which the monopoly of violence is put into practice. This process starts with 
moral outrage in society and politics regarding, say, the dire human rights’ situation 
in Afghanistan. This is followed by a political reaction (based on the shared moral 
outrage, but probably also based on serving the voters). The question is whether 
the moral outrage of the first, public phase in this process is (still) present in the 
political and the military phases that follow. Or, to put it differently, is the social 
conscience that produces the moral outrage mirrored in the conscience of the indi-
vidual politician and soldier? This question seems relevant, for the presence of a 
well functioning conscience seems a prerequisite for morally responsible actions. 
In order to answer this question a closer look at the meaning of the concept of 
conscience can be helpful. 
 In his book Conscience and Conscientious Objections (2007), philosopher Anders 
Schinkel interprets conscience as a concerned awareness of the moral quality of our 
own contribution to the process of reality, including our own being. On the basis 
of historical and philosophical research, Schinkel describes conscience as a symbol 
with three core elements: (1) ultimate concern, (2) intimacy (3) presence of a wit-
ness (2007: 106). Ultimate concern refers to the experience that it is a necessity that 
something should be done. It is also clear that one’s own standards are deficient and 
that a superior standard is needed; Schinkel gives the example of Socrates’ aware-
ness of falling short with regard to his own wisdom and his willingness to learn. 
The ability to be aware of and acknowledge one’s own limitations and fallibility is 
crucial in this respect; it seems the only protection against the hubris of decisions 
that are taken too quickly and without due reflection. It is clear that judgment plays 
a crucial role with regard to conscience (2007: 108). The second element (intimacy) 
implies a strong personal involvement; there can be no ultimate concern without 
it. It is important that one realizes: ‘this is about me,’ and that one feels one’s own 
responsibility. It is the experience that one’s identity is at stake. The third element 
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(witness) implies the awareness that there is a spectator witnessing our actions 
and thoughts; the metaphor of the heart seems to fulfil this function as ‘an excel-
lent witness’ (Schinkel, 2007: 112); the concepts syneidesis and conscientia (the Greek 
and Roman roots of our concept of conscience) refer to an internal witness. This 
also holds for Adam Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’ or ‘great inmate of the breast,’ for 
Hobbes expression (based on Quintilianus) that ‘conscience is a thousand witness-
es’ (Schinkel, 2007: 113), and for the metaphor of the (divine) ‘voice of conscience,’ 
which refers to the experience of being spoken to, as is described by Socrates and 
in the Bible. This ‘voice’ carries a special authority and experiencing it has as such a 
transcendental quality. For Heidegger conscience is what constitutes the subject as 
an individual. Heidegger describes it as a call, in the interpretation of Staten ‘a call 
to Care’ (Schinkel, 2007: 120). 
 To put Schinkel’s analysis in a nutshell: our conscience tells us that it is crucial 
for us to do something in a particular situation, that it is our responsibility, even 
our obligation, to act, and that our actions are being scrutinized. Also in a military 
context, it is, ideally, our conscience that tells us to act, at times even to use violence. 
This is in line with the Just War tradition which, as mentioned in the above, teaches 
us that waging war is not, as such, a reprehensible act; it might even be a moral obli-
gation. The willingness to bind war to rules has developed throughout the course 
of history, and the Just War tradition and the Geneva Conventions are examples 
of this attempt. They can be interpreted as the social and political conscience, dis-
cussed at the beginning of this section. However, rules never cover every situation 
and the ability to think and judge adequately are therefore indispensible; some-
thing which presupposes individual conscience. Yet, as indicated before, not every 
soldiers’ conscience is the same, neither is his or her level of moral development or 
moral professionalization. Nonetheless, today, in missions like the one in Uruzgan, 
the level of compliance with humanitarian rules seems higher than ever, and codes 
of conduct and military ethics courses testify to the fact that morally responsible 
behaviour is seen as a necessary prerequisite for professional (i.e., ‘good’) soldiering. 
 However, the conscience of the individual soldier, formed and educated in eth-
ics courses and training sessions, is probably not the only factor here. It seems that 
the omnipresence of the media, social media included, have magnified the three 
core elements of the symbol of consciences discussed above. Knowing that the eye 
of the camera is focused on one’s actions and scrutinizes every move, makes one 
adamant to act in a morally responsible way. Foucault’s disciplinary gaze, described 
in his Discipline and Punish (1977), may have found a twenty-first century equivalent 
in the omnipresence of the media, which introduces, next to the old symbol of the 
heart, another symbol for conscience: the eye of the camera. That is not necessarily 
a bad thing; now and then, it seems to be that eye that stands between a soldier and 
a war crime.
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Conclusion 
In today’s operations, the combined forces of law, politics, an increased moral sen-
sitivity, public opinion, and extensive media coverage, both at home and abroad, 
not only pose considerable limitations on Western troops, but, notwithstanding the 
fact that these factors do not always work in the same direction, to a certain extent 
also help troops to make true their expressed ambition (that is, by some members 
of militaries) to be a force for good. The media, in particular, seem to play an impor-
tant role here, but can only perform that function if they keep their independence. 
Recent years have shown that embedded journalists mainly write about their own 
military, and pay much less attention to the suffering of the local population than 
journalists working independently from the military. 
 Also in the case of Uruzgan the majority of the newspaper articles was about 
Dutch soldiers, while only a small minority pointed to the plight of the Afghani 
(HCSS, 2008). Yet, although in general attracting less attraction than losses among 
Western military personnel and victim of war crimes, civilians killed unintention-
ally form the majority of those killed in today’s conflicts. That their deaths are, 
although foreseen, not intended possibly explains why these civilian casualties are, 
in general, deemed less important than Western military casualties (Shaw, 2005: 
79-88). It is perceived that way by both politicians and the populations at large in 
the West, hence the emphasis on relatively safe ways of delivering firepower, such 
as artillery and high-flying bombers. 
 Seeing that many of today’s civilian casualties are foreseeable, one might wonder 
if the threshold should not be somewhat higher than it has been in recent years. It 
is likely that taking civilian deaths seriously as such (i.e., as something to be avoided 
independently of what is in it for us) would possibly result in the postponement 
or cancellation of particular missions in even more cases than the aforementioned 
reasons of expedience at present already lead to. However, as mentioned in the 
introduction, there is an expediency based argument here too: if tactics that put 
civilians at risk can drive the local population in the hands of the insurgents, a 
more impartial ethic will in the long run benefit outsiders, colleagues, and defence 
organizations alike. 
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